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OVERRULING DRED SCOTT: THE CASE FOR
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Robert A. Burt-
Dred Scott v. Sandfordl is widely acknowledged to be the
worst decision ever rendered by the United States Supreme Court.
Its specific holdings-that Congress had no authority to regulate
slavery in the territories and that no black person, whether slave or
free, was a citizen of the United States entitled to bring suit in
federal courts2-were overruled by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, enacted in the immediate wake of the Civil War.3
But as we mark its 150th anniversary, it is not enough to say that
the Dred Scott decision has been overruled. It is not enough to say
that slavery has been abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment and
that African Americans have been acknowledged as United States
citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. We must ask whether these
two amendments, taken together, did more than overrule the
specific holdings of Dred Scott. We must ask whether there was a
deeper meaning to the reversal of this decision in order to
determine whether the underlying assumptions of Dred Scott have
truly been repudiated in our constitutional realm.
In fact, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did more
than simply overrule the specific substantive rulings in the Dred
Scott case. The amendments were aimed, more fundamentally, at
overruling the Supreme Court's underlying rationale for adopting
these specific rules about slavery and black citizenship.4 This
underlying rationale was stated by Chief Justice Taney in the
following passage: black people, he said, were "beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race
... and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2Id. at 427,452.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIIl, § 1 (ratified December 18, 1866); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (ratified July 28, 1868).
4 ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 206-11 (1992).
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was bound to respect. ,,5 Taney thus clearly understood that the
losing parties in his Court were not simply disfavored or
unpopular, but were excluded from common bonds of humanity as
"beings of an inferior order. ,,6 By abolishing the very status of
"involuntary servitude," the Thirteenth Amendment signaled the
wrongfulness of treating anyone as "beings of an inferior order."
The Fourteenth Amendment expanded upon this understanding,
not only by extending citizenship to "all persons born or
naturalized in the United States," but by guaranteeing "equal
protection of the laws" to "any person," not just to blacks and not
just to United States citizens.7 The two amendments were aimed at
accomplishing what Abraham Lincoln had identified at Gettysburg
as the "unfinished work" of the Civil War-to bring forth "a new
birth of freedom. ,,8 The two amendments thus wholeheartedly
embraced the declaration that "all men are created equal.,,9
The guarantee of "equality" is, of course, not self-defining.
Each of us differs in various ways from one another, and state
recognition of some difference is not an automatic violation of the
rule that all of us are created equal. Inequality as such-state
treatment of some people as simply different from and less favored
than others-is not forbidden. The constitutional wrong is
inequality that marks its subjects as a different order of humanity,
that they are outside the bonds of human connection, "so far
inferior, that they had no rights which [others are] bound to
respect." 10 This is the basic conception of human equality-of
equal dignity-that was dishonored by Dred Scott.
How then should courts give specific content to this basic
conception so as to avoid the error of Dred Scott? There are two
dimensions to this question-a substantive dimension (what
content should courts give to the definition of "equality"?) and a
process dimension (how should courts work their way toward this
definition?). To explore these two dimensions, I will focus
5 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
6Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l.
S President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) in
7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
9 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
10 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
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attention on contemporary claims for state recognition of same-sex
marnage.
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSION
The specific words of the Constitution are important. Life-
tenured federal judges have essentially unchecked power to impose
their vision of the Constitution on the rest of us. The only restraint
on their power is the requirement that their rulings have some
strong basis in the words of the Constitution. And if we look at the
text of the Constitution, we cannot find any specific reference to
marriage, sex, or homosexuals. Some people-Justices Scalia and
Thomas preeminently among them-quickly assert that this is the
end of the enterprise. 11 They would say that the Constitution does
not deal with the subject of same-sex sodomy or same-sex
marriage; therefore, states are free to do whatever they want. But
the problem with this narrow literalism is that it is not a true
reading of the obvious intent of the people who wrote the words of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is as clear as any claim about a
historical fact can be; the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
had an expansive conception of "equality" that they meant to
protect and they envisioned future judges would give expanding
content to that word, to that ideal. 12 The Scalia/Thomas narrow
literalism is simply not true to the meaning of the words that their
authors, the framers, clearly had in mind.
But does this leave judges entirely at large in defining
"equality"? Does this leave them free simply to impose their own
personal, moral judgments loosely dressed up in fancy
constitutional verbiage? I do not think so. I think it is possible to
read the document in a responsibly constrained way-and I think
this is particularly true about an issue like the constitutional claim
for same-sex marriage.
This is, however, an impossible definitional task if we simply
focus on the single word "equality." Looked at in isolation, it is
truly impossible to decide whether same-sex marriage is equal to
II See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 605-06 (Thomas, 1., dissenting).
12 For a discussion of the framers' views, see Robert A. Burt, Miranda and
Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 84-86, 89-95 (1969).
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or different from mixed-sex marriage. In some ways it is the same
because a loving couple, whether of mixed gender or the same
gender, wants to make a long-term, publicly recognized, and
officially enforceable commitment to one another; and in some
ways, it is different because two men are not the same as one man
and one woman. So if we just stare at the word "equality," we have
no basis for deciding whether the similarities outweigh the
differences or vice versa.
But it makes no sense to view a word like "equality" in
isolation, as if that word were simply self-defining. As with all
words in any language, a single word only takes on meaning when
it is presented in the full context of its social usage. And so we
must read this word in the Fourteenth Amendment as it was used in
its social and historical context.
The "equality" word came into our Constitution when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.13 That amendment
immediately followed the ratification in 1865 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which proclaimed that "[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States.,,14
The Fourteenth Amendment was clearly adopted as part of the
implementation project following from the abolition of slavery. 15
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment itself
unmistakably refers to the abolition of slavery. 16 That first sentence
provides that "[a]ll persons born ... in the United States, ... are
citizens of the United States,,,I? thus directly overruling the
Supreme Court's 1857 holding in the Dred Scott case that no black
person, whether slave or free, could be a citizen of the United
States. 18 The second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that "[n]o State shall '" deny to any person ... the equal
protection of the laws." 19 There is thus a clear contextual linkage
between the abolition of slavery and this "equality" guarantee.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14Id. amend. XIII, § 1.
15 BURT, supra note 4, at 206-07.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17Id.
18 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422-23 (1857).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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But the meaning of this linkage is itself not self-defining. At
least two alternative readings are possible. One reading is that
because slavery had become essentially racialized by the time of
the Civil War-since blacks, that is, were considered the
quintessential slaves-the "equality" guarantee in the Fourteenth
Amendment applies principally, perhaps even exclusively, to
blacks. It is true, of course, that the second sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment extends its protection to "persons" rather
than to blacks as such; however, the first sentence speaks of the
citizenship rights of "persons" rather than blacks, but the
unmistakable reference in this first sentence is not to any or all
persons but specifically to black people excluded from citizenship
by the Dred Scott ruling.
But a very different reading is equally plausible, and I would
say this different reading is more plausible, especially based on the
statements made by the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment in
the congressional debates of 1866, just six months after the
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified?O The draftsmen made clear
that by explicitly speaking of the rights of "people" rather than
"freed slaves" or "black people," the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to generalize for all folitical relations the lessons drawn
from the abolition of slavery.2 Read in this way, we can see how
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the principle that Lincoln
drew on when insisting on the moral wrongfulness of slavery; that
the ideal expressed in the Declaration of Independence, that "all
men are created equal," applied most clearly to white men
struggling against colonial oppression by Great Britain, but that
this ideal was intended by the founders, even in 1776, to extend in
due course to all men, black as well as white.22 From this
20 CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542-43 (1866).
21 Id. at 2542. Thus, Representative John Bingham, the principal draftsman
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated in the congressional debates, "[T]his
amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to it. No State ever
had the right ... to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws ...
although many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without
remedy." Id.
22 See Burt, supra note 12, at 84-87; see also THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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perspective, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were the
fulfillment of the generalized promise of the American Revolution.
To give full content to the meaning of "equality" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, we must explore the connection between
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. We must ask
ourselves, that is, what was truly wrong about slavery; this will
lead us to a richer understanding of the meaning of the guarantee
that all persons in the United States must be treated as equals rather
than as "masters" and "slaves."
The status of being a slave carried with it many deep
indignities. Perhaps the first attribute that comes to mind is "slave
labor." But the evil in this practice was not the absence of
compensation for labor. In fact, as Southern plantation owners
tirelessly insisted, slaves were compensated for their labor by the
provision of food, housing, and clothes. Indeed, Southern
slaveholders drew a favorable comparison with their provision of
lifetime support for their slaves even when they were no longer
productive, in contrast with the Northern industrial practices of so-
called wage slavery, where the capitalist owners would simply fire
any unproductive worker no matter how long he had served his
capitalist master.23 It is more to the point that the evil of slave labor
was not lack of compensation, but lack of choice about
employment. But even here, the Southern slave owners observed
that Northern industrial workers were deprived of choice about
whether or where to work by impersonal market forces with the
same practical impact as the personalized deprivation of choice
imposed on plantation slaves.24
But whatever the significance of forced labor for defining the
core evil of slave status, whatever the differences may be between
"free labor" and "slave labor," there is one attribute of slave status
that is radically and undeniably different from freedom. That
attribute is the legal recognition of family relationships?5 Slaves
23 ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REpUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR ix-xxxix (1995) (with a new
introduction).
24Id. at 66-67.
25 See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD:
BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 296-97 (1988).
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were not simply forbidden by law to marry;26 because they were
the property of their masters, slaves had no legally recognized
relationship with anyone else.27 They had biological connections
with their children, they had loving connections with one another,
but none of these connections were approved or permitted by
law.28 So far as the law was concerned, nothing impeded masters
from selling their slaves to far-away purchasers, breaking the
slaves' bonds of love and biology with their mates and their
children.29 And the law affirmed the morality of such
heartbreaking actions. As the anthropologist Orlando Patterson has
described it, slavery was a status of "social death"; and slaves
were, he said, "natally alienated"-that is, even worse than dead,
they were alive but not part of the human species.3o Their forced
labor was not the hallmark of this dehumanized status; the law's
disregard for their bonds with other beings, its refusal to recognize
their family relationships, and their inability to marry in the eyes of
the law was much more at the core of the social degradation
inflicted on them.
Free blacks-the small number who had been released from
slavery by their masters, or the even smaller number who had
never been enslaved-were legally authorized to marry before the
Civil War.31 But a special disability was imposed on them in a few
states that prohibited marriages between blacks and whites and,
even more, imposed criminal penalties on violators-not just the
interracial couples themselves, but anyone who performed the
marriage ceremony itself.32 In the Dred Scott decision, Chief
Justice Taney cited the existence of these miscegenation statutes to
demonstrate that interracial intermarriages "were regarded as
unnatural and immoral," and accordingly, "this stigma, of the
deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole [Negro] race.,,33
26 Fox-GENovESE, supra note 25.
27Id.
28 I d.
29 Id. See also ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 6 (1982).
30 PATTERSON, supra note 29, at 51.
31Id. at 241.
32Id. at 409 n.25.
33 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
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Taney did not say this with any regret but as support for the
proposition that it would be equally "unnatural and immoral" to
regard black people as citizens, as members of the American
political community.34 And the implication of this exclusion from
citizenship was even deeper; the implication was that, so far as the
United States Supreme Court was concerned, blacks generally
(whether slave or free) were excluded from, were inherently alien
to, the human race?5
After the Civil War, the liberated slaves were permitted to
marry one another.36 But miscegenation laws prohibitin~
interracial marriage were then enacted in every Southern state.3
The expanded reach of these laws reflected a new fear of blacks
among Southern whites. Before the Civil War, the predominant
Southern white fear was that slaves would rebel against and
slaughter their white masters.38 After the Civil War, white fear of
blacks took a new tum; the fear became much more avowedly and
intensely sexualized.39 Black males in particular were transformed,
in the feverish imagination of Southern whites, from potential
political rebels to sexual predators.4o Underlying these
miscegenation laws, a new Southern white practice arose of
lynching mobs, whipped into an especially murderous rage against
black men accused of raping (or, in the same key, simply having
I · . h) h· 41sexua mtercourse WIt w Ite women.
Miscegenation laws remained in effect in many states for a
full century after the end of the Civil War and the abolition of
slavery. It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court
ruled that Virginia's miscegenation law violated the Constitution.42
34 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409.
35Id.
36 Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History ofActing Married,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 957,1013 n.267 (2000).
37 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,6 & n.5 (1967).
38 JOEL WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORDER: BLACKIWHITE RELATIONS IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 84 (1986) (abridged edition of
THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACKIWHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH
SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984».
39Id.
40Id. at 84, 186-91.
41Id. at 189.
42 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12.
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In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court relied on two
grounds for invalidating the law. First, the Court ruled that the law
wrongly relied on a racial classification that was demeaning to
blacks and an expression of white supremacy.43 This ground was
not at all surprising in light of the Court's 1954 ruling in Brown v.
Board ofEducation that racial classification of schoolchildren was
unconstitutiona1.44 But more surprisingly, the Court set out a
second, independent ground for invalidating Virginia's
miscegenation law.45 The Court Eroclaimed that the law violated
the fundamental right to marry. 6 "The freedom to marry," the
Court said, "has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. ,,47
This second ground was not necessary to the Court's holding;
the first ground, regarding the wrongfulness of racial
categorizations, was quite sufficient to dispose of the case.
Moreover, this second ground was essentially unprecedented.
Though prior cases had mentioned marriage as a "basic civil right,"
no Supreme Court decision had ever struck down restrictions
imposed by state marriage laws regarding who was entitled to
marry whom. The Court thus reached out in this 1967 Virginia
case for a novel legal formulation to identify the constitutional evil
in state miscegenation laws. The Court did not explain why it had
done this. Indeed, this second ground in its ruling came at the very
end of the Court's opinion and was stated in only two short
paragraphs.48 But, I believe, this novel second ground was
enunciated because the Court understood-perhaps consciously,
perhaps only intuitively-that there was a crucial linkage between
slavery and legal barriers to marriage. The Court understood that
enslavement was not simply the subordination of black people by
white people, but the dehumanization of blacks-a degradation
that found the clearest expression not simply in the invidious use
of racial classifications, but in the denial to black people of their
fundamental right to marry.
43 Loving, 388 U.S. at I I.
44 Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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This is the framework in which we should approach state
refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. The basic question is not
whether separate classifications for heterosexual and same-sex
relationships are rationally plausible or based on long-standing
moral or social traditions. The basic question is whether state
prohibition of same-sex marriage reflects the same underlying
attitude toward gays and lesbians that legal prohibition of
interracial marriages signified toward blacks. This question was
clearly answered by Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case. As
I noted earlier, Taney observed that interracial marriages "were
regarded as unnatural and immoral ... [and a] stigma, of the
deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole [Negro] race. ,,49
State laws forbidding same-sex marriages are equally based on a
judgment that they are "unnatural and immoral" and fix a "stigma
of the deepest degradation" upon all gays and lesbians.
Taney relied on the miscegenation laws to deduce that black
people, as such, were not eligible for United States citizenship.
Here too, we can see a direct parallel in contemporary legal
regulations. Current law provides that openly, self-identified gays
and lesbians are not eligible for service in the United States
military. 50 This categorical exclusion from the very hallmark of
United States citizenship is, as with the exclusion of blacks from
citizenship, not simply a formalistic disability; the exclusion
denotes a "stigma of the deepest degradation," an alienation from a
common status not simply of citizenship but of shared humanity.51
The Supreme Court's proclamation in Loving v. Virginia of a
"fundamental right to marry" recognized the centrality of legally
authorized marital status in social acknowledgment of shared
membership in the human race. More recently, in Lawrence v.
Texas,52 overruling the Texas criminal sodomy law, the Court has
taken the first step-but only the first step-toward the same
embrace of gays and lesbians as acknowledged members of the
49 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 409 (1857).
50 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)-(b) (1993).
5\ The constitutionality of this categorical exclusion from the military has
been upheld in Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928-29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 948 (1996) and Able v. United States, ISS F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir.
1998). The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed the issue.
52 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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human community. One next step would be-and should be-to
undo the exclusion of gays and lesbians from human status by
recognizing their right to marry one another in the same way that
the marriage of heterosexual couples are publicly celebrated under
the aegis of state law. I believe this result is not simply morally
correct, but it is constitutionally required by the conjunctive force
of the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery and the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing every person-not just
African Americans freed from slavery, but every person-equal
protection of the laws.
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE PROCESS DIMENSION
We now come to the "remedial" question-that is, once we
have defined the most plausible meaning of the word "equality" in
the Constitution, how should a court go about enforcing this
defined meaning on officials and citizens who disagree with this
definition? To identify this as a separate question might seem
confusing, even wrong. One might say, if the judges have
decided---on whatever basis-the true meaning of a word in the
Constitution, then they should simply enforce that meaning on
everyone. But this conception of judicial authority is as narrowly
literalist, as isolated from any social and historical context, as the
literalist reading of the words of the Constitution. If the words of
the Constitution are nothing but a collection of readily
determinative dictionary meanings, then a kind of authoritative,
even dictatorial, reading of the document seems not only
permissible, but even logically---one might say, lexically-
required. But if, as I maintain, the words of the constitutional
document only come to life through a richer understanding of its
social and historical meanings, then it follows that a richer, more
contextualized conception of the interpretive process is also
necessary to give recognizable content to the bare words of the
Constitution.
From this contextual perspective, the proposition that the
definitive meaning of the Constitution should be unilaterally
announced by nine or five supreme oracles in black robes-as if
they were simply the impersonal, authoritative vehicles for the
transmission of God's word from Mount Sinai-is incoherent, a
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mistaken conception of the process by which constitutional
meaning becomes recognized. Constitutional interpretation in a
contextual perspective is more interactive than authoritative. It
must proceed consultatively, not dictatorially; and for this purpose,
the interpretive process must take place over time rather than at
one fixed moment in time. This process must involve many
different actors whose views must be respectfully solicited. Most
of all, the interpretive process must depend on persuading people
with divergent views to come to some harmonized perspective,
rather than commanding the defeat, the utter surrender, of one
contestant by another.
This, in final analysis, is the precise meaning of the "equality"
guarantee in our Fourteenth Amendment; the way in which
"equality" is translated from an abstract word into a living reality.
This reliance on persuasion over time, rather than command and
control at a fixed moment in time, is the way that judicial authority
can become harmonized with the democratic principles at the core
of our constitutional enterprise.53
This is a somewhat abstract statement about the constitutional
interpretive process. Let me put these abstractions in a concrete
context-the context of giving meaning to the constitutional right
to state recognition of same-sex marriages. It is easy to understand
how that right comes into recognition via an oracular, dictatorial
conception of Supreme Court authority-the Court simply defines
the right and that is that. It may have seemed that I was engaging
in this dictatorial enterprise in my contextual reading of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. But what would it mean
to say that the right which I have deduced from this contextual
reading comes into recognized authoritative status only through a
consultative, interactive, and persuasive process presided over by
nine judges in black robes?
To illustrate this interactive process, I want to return to the
linkage that I have already drawn between the degradation of
slavery and deprivations of marital and familial status.54 I want to
53 For an elaboration of this statement, see general1y ROBERT A. BURT, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992) (addressing the concept of judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
54 See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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show-in a very abbreviated, summary fashion-how issues of
marriage, family, and sexual expression generally lurked in the
background of the judicial decisions of the mid-twentieth century
that led to Brown v. Board ofEducation in 1954 (regarding public
school segregation) and then, thirteen years later, to Loving v.
Virginia (overturning state miscegenation laws). The story does
not begin with Brown in 1954. The story that I want to tell begins
in the late 1930s, when Thurgood Marshall, then chief counsel of
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, was charting the litigation
strategy that ultimately led to Brown and then to Loving.
The Jim Crow regime of racial segregation and subordination
rested on a false promise that separate facilities could be "equal"-
a promise endorsed by the Supreme Court's 1896 decision in
Plessy v. Ferguson. 55 Marshall's strategy for unmasking the true,
subjugative meaning of race segregation was to demonstrate in
litigation that separate was inherently unequal.56 But where should
he begin this demonstration-with racially segregated water
fountains, public bathrooms, public busses, elementary schools, or
with all of the above? Marshall carefully, even surgically, chose a
single target-racially segregated graduate school education in
public universities.57
There were many reasons that led Marshall to avoid a
wholesale assault on all race segregation, or even on all public
school segregation, and to choose this specific target of graduate
school education; but I want to focus on one specific reason that
Marshall himself gave many years later in an informal interview.
Though he did not say this in any formal pleadings that he filed in
court, Marshall later said:
Those racial supremacy boys somehow think that little kids of
six or seven are going to get funny ideas about sex and
marriage just from going to school together, but for some
equally funny reason youngsters in law school aren't supposed
to feel that way. We didn't get it but we decided that if that was
55 163 U.S. 537,544-45 (1896).
56 MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 170-72 (1994).
57Id. at 11-14.
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what the South believed, then the best thing for the moment
58was to go along.
In other words, Marshall understood that in the 1930s and '40s
the prospect of race mixing among young adults in graduate
schools was less provocative to Southern whites-less sexually
provocative-than the racial mixing of elementary schoolchildren.
Marshall says this differentiation seemed utterly irrational to him,
that he "didn't get it.,,59 But I want to offer some quick speculations
about this apparent irrationality and the strategic wisdom of
Marshall's choice to "go along for the moment,,60 with this
irrational differentiation between graduate students and young
schoolchildren.
I have already noted the fantasies of sexual predation by black
men unleashed among white Southerners by the abolition of
slavery after the Civil War. These fantasies were only one
expression of a widespread fear immediately after the Civil War
among Northerners, as well as Southerners, that the War itself had
somehow unleashed dangerous, destructive, and seductive sexual
behaviors and that this disruptive conduct must be brought under
control.61 For a parallel expression of this fear, consider the post-
Civil War federal campaign against polygamy in the Territories.62
In his 1871 State of the Union address, President Ulysses S. Grant
referred to the Mormon practice of polygamy as "a remnant of
barbarism, repugnant to civilization, to decency, and to the laws of
the United States. ,,63 During the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the federal government waged a campaign of escalating
58 Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT
HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION 307, 318 (John A. Garraty ed., rev. ed.,
Harper Torchbooks 1987) (1962).
59Id.
6°Id.
61 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
62 See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26
HOFSTRA L. REv. 53, 62-65 (1997).
63 President Ulysses S. Grant, State of the Union Address (Dec. 4, 1871),
available at http://www.thisnation.com/library/sotu/I87Iug.html.
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severity through criminal prosecutions and seizure of Mormon
Church assets to stamp out this reprehensible practice.64
For another example of this fear of unleashed sexuality,
consider the new statutes which swept the country between 1860
and 1880 criminalizing abortion; before the Civil War, abortion
was freely and legally available during the first trimester of
pregnancy.65 Consider the post-Civil War enactment of so-called
Comstock laws banning the sale or use of contraceptives.66
Consider the new state laws regulating who may become married.
In the pre-Civil War days, no prior state license was required for
any couple who wanted to get married.67 If the couple found a
preacher, or even if they just lived together and said that they were
married, that was enough under the law.68 But the new post-Civil
War laws required a prior state license for everyone. These new
license laws not only prohibited interracial marriages and
polygamy, but they forbade so-called "mentally defective" people,
people with sexually transmitted diseases, and people with
supposed inheritable diseases (such as epilepsy) from marrying.69
Two themes lay beneath all of these instances of new post-
Civil War state laws regulating marriage and sexual conduct: First,
the need to assert firm social control over marital and sexual
conduct (in response, I would say, to the extraordinary turmoil that
the country had just experienced in the shattering of social order
and bonds of shared citizenship in the waging of the Civil War
64 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (finding that Congress' enactment oflegis1ation
caused the charter of the church to be annulled and the assets of the church to
escheat to the government); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)
(upholding bigamy conviction).
65 See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 200 (1978).
66 See NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND
FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 36-37 (1997).
67 Dubler, supra note 36, at 970.
68Id. at 970-71.
69 Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in
American Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 IND. L. REv. 273, 278-80 (1995). Cf
Dubler, supra note 36, at 970-72.
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itself7o). Second, not simply to suppress socially undesirable
behavior, but also to establish a new set of norms of socially
desirable behavior, norms of "purity" embodying "sanctified"
marital and sexual conduct that were rigidly differentiated from
"impure" or "dirty" or "defiled" activities. As President Grant had
disparaged polygamy, so too marriage between whites and blacks,
marriage with diseased or defective people, and the practices of
abortion and contraception were viewed as acts of "barbarism,
repugnant to civilization [and] to decency.,,7!
Race segregation laws were equally concerned with protecting
"purity"-in this case, the imagined "purity of the White race"-
from contamination. Thus the obsession with segregating shared
physical space between blacks and whites-guarding against
drinking from the same water fountains, sitting side by side in
public busses or railway cars, or using the same bathroom
facilities. Segregated education was equally understood as
protecting zones of "white purity" from "black contamination."
This obsession with "purity" is the key to understanding the beliefs
among the "racial supremacy boys," as Marshall mockingly
observed, that "little kids of six or seven" were much more likely
than law students "to get funny ideas about sex and marriage just
from going to [mixed-race] school together."n It was precisely
because these young children were viewed as still untouched by
sexual feelings, still "pure," not yet "sullied" as compared to
already-fallen law students that the Southern whites viewed race
segregation in elementary schools with so much greater intensity,
so much greater resistance to any change.73
There are deep irrationalities here. But there is an internal
logic to these irrationalities that, when they are at full tide, make
them virtually impervious to rational persuasion. The internal logic
has been compellingly described by anthropologist Mary Douglas
70 See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920
(David Donald ed., 1967) (describing the economic, political, and social turmoil
during the years following the Civil War).
71 Grant, supra note 63. See also supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
72 Kelly, supra note 58, at 318.
73Id at 318-23.
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in her classic book, Purity and Danger.74 In the very title of her
book, Douglas indicates that in cultural terms the opposite of
purity is not just "impurity" but something more powerful and
ominous. That is, the opposite of "purity" is "danger." The very
structure of human culture, of civilization-our intellectual and
emotional capacity to construct intelligible meaning in a world of
sensory flux, our capacity to feel safe in a world filled with
threats-is built upon categorical distinctions between what is
permissible and what is prohibited, between the sacred and the
profane, and between what is pure and what is dangerous.75
As Douglas demonstrates, the specific content of these
categorizations varies from generation to generation; but though
the content changes, the impulse, the human imperative, remains
the same to distinguish between these categories of purity and
danger and to cling to them as life rafts in a turbulent sea.76
Douglas also demonstrates that in moments of great historical
upheaval, the contents of these categories suddenly appear
inadequate, precisely because their observance had failed to avert
the upheaval.77 So the old contents fade but the imperative to
differentiate opposed categories of purity and danger persists, and
these categories are filled in with new content.78 This is what
occurred in the United States following the national trauma of the
Civil War, in the new legal regime I have described to control
marital and sexual conduct.
If this process of categorization is a basic characteristic of
human civilization, if it is in effect "hard-wired" into our cultural
self-understandings, then two questions follow: First, if the
categorizations of "purity" and "danger" persist, is it nonetheless
important to try to change the content of these categories through
rational human choice? Second, how can this change be brought
about?
It is, I think, easier to answer the first question. This is a
question of normative principle, whether there are some extrinsic
74 MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF
POLLUTION AND TABOO 3-4 (1966).
75 Id. at 4-5.
76 !d. at 36-37.
77 Jd. at 37.
78 Jd. at 38-40.
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standards for judging the goodness of these categories; whether,
one might say, some kinds of "purity" are intrinsically more "pure"
than others; and whether some kinds of "danger" categorizations
are more dangerous than others. Many different kinds of content
can fill in these opposed categories (contents, for example, about
what and what not to eat or to wear or to pray for). Of these many
different kinds of contents, I would say that the most dangerous-
the most normatively unjustified-is the categorization of some
human beings as "pure" and others as "contaminated." The
traditional caste system in India exemplifies this kind of content
categorization. The treatment of Jews in Europe, culminating in the
Nazi Holocaust, is another example. The status of African
Americans in our own culture is a third example. In our
Constitution, in the document that constitutes our national identity,
our own American culture has condemned this kind of
categorization of human beings through the abolition of slavery in
the Thirteenth Amendment and the extension of that ideal in the
guarantee of equality to all persons in the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is why I said that the first question is "easier" for us to
answer than the second question, which is, how do we proceed to
change the content of the categorizations when some people are
defined as "contaminated" as compared to others who are "pure"?
Here is where I see a special role for the judiciary and where I see
the judicial actions in addressing the status of African Americans
during the half-century between the late 1930s and the mid-1980s
as the model for implementing this moral imperative of attempting
to remove the stigma of "contamination" imposed on a scorned,
vulnerable group of people.
There are three essential steps in this process. The first step is
for the judiciary to take the initiative in identifying, in publicly
acknowledging, the factual existence of this stigmatization of some
specific group and the fact of its moral wrongfulness. By taking
this first step, the judiciary offers its moral recognition to the
stigmatized group. The judges' actions, in themselves, tell the
members of this group that they are no longer excluded and alone,
that there is now a new witness, a morally salient public witness,
who sees and condemns the indignities and humiliations that the
oppressed people had previously endured in enforced silence.
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The second step in this remedial process is that the members
of the oppressed group are encouraged by, emboldened by, the
unprecedented visibility and moral recognition that the judges have
offered to them. The members of the oppressed group step away
from their accustomed acquiescent posture of social silence and
openly, publicly, proclaim the reality of their suffering and the
injustice of it. This is the step that Rosa Parks took when she
refused to give up her seat to a white man on a public bus in
Montgomery, Alabama. Parks' uprising by remaining seated was a
revolutionary act. And it was not coincidental that this brave act
took place in 1955, just one year after the Supreme Court's ruling
in Brown v. Board of Education.79 Parks' action precipitated an
economic boycott of the public bus system and of white businesses
by virtually the entire black population of Montgomery. so
This bo('cott marked the beginning of the modern Civil Rights
movement.s The Supreme Court's role in precipitating this public
"coming out" of an oppressed and previously silenced people was
made clear in the first speech that Martin Luther King, Jr. gave in a
Montgomery church-the speech that marked the beginning of
King's leadership of the Civil Rights movement. King said in that
Montgomery church in 1955, "[W]e're going to work with grim
and bold determination-to gain justice on the buses in this city.
And we are not wrong ... in what we are doing. If we are wrong-
the Supreme Court of this nation is wrong. If we are wrong-God
Almighty is wrong!"S2
This second step--the coming forward, the public coming out
of the oppressed group--cannot be commanded by any court, it
can only be encouraged. The group must find its own voice; it
must take courage from the new recognition given to them. And if
this second step does indeed occur, then a third step becomes
possible. The third step is that the oppressors-the socially favored
79 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80 TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63, at 132-205 (1988).
81/d.
82 Id. at 140 (citing Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Montgomery
Improvement Association Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5,
1955), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: Birth of a New Age,
December 1955-December 1956, at 73 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1997».
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group, the "pure" and "normal" human beings-are led to see the
suffering imposed on the disfavored group in a way that potentially
inspires a sense of empathy, of fellow-feeling, of acknowledged
bonds of humanity.
This third step does not come easily. The oppression of the
disfavored group has been so humiliating, so totalizing, precisely
because rigid maintenance of the rock-solid status of the status-
differentiations has been so powerfully important to the dominant
group, to the "pure" human beings, for their own sense of
psychological safety and well-being. A total and frontal assault on
these status-differentiations is likely to be met with more than
stubborn resistance by the dominant group. Even more fatally for
the success of the corrective enterprise, the assault will be met with
simple incomprehension-as if some outsider from the planet Mars
were raising questions about the very nature of reality. But until
the dominant oppressors have been led to redefine their
relationship to the oppressed group, the genuine experience of
equality on the part of both the oppressed and the oppressors will
remain beyond reach.
The challenge in this moral process, this social experience of
"conscience" and "consciousness" raising, is not simply for some
dictator-some nine or five elderly lawyers in Washington, D.C.-
to announce the true dictionary meaning of "equality," as that word
appears in the dusty historical document of the Constitution. The
deeper, truer challenge is for those elderly lawyers, those judges, to
translate that dusty word into a living reality. To accomplish this
transformation, judges cannot act alone. They lack this truly
transformative power, either in practical or in moral terms. For
both practical and moral reasons, the judges must actively appeal
to others for assistance.
This is the social process that is now under way regarding the
status of gays and lesbians in American society. The Supreme
Court was slow-too slow-in taking up this moral issue. The
opportunity was given to the Court in 1986. But in Bowers v.
Hardwick,83 a Court majority blew this opportunity away when
they mockingly dismissed the claim of a gay couple against their
83 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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criminal prosecution for sodomy.84 Indeed, not only on this issue,
but for most of its history, the Court has taken the wrong side-the
side of the socially conventional, the socially comfortable, the
"pure" oppressors against "contaminated outsiders." The moments
when the Court has understood and acted on its proper function as
the constitutional guarantor of equality under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments have been all too rare. But Brown v.
Board of Education was one such shining moment. The Court's
2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas-explicitly overruling
Bowers-was another shining moment.85
Gays and lesbians did not need this judicial decision to find
the courage to step forward from their shadowed closets, to
demand respect for their basic humanity. The publicly visible civil
rights movements for them had already taken flight-emboldened,
I believe, by the historic examples of Brown and Parks and King
and the entire experience of the Black Civil Rights movement,86
The Supreme Court, one might say, has finally and belatedly
joined a parade already in progress. But this federal judicial action,
in tum, has prompted a few state court judges to rely on state
constitutions for ruling in favor of same-sex coupling.
These judges in different states have come to different
conclusions about the claims for state recognition of these
marriages. Some, as in Vermont and New Jersey, have said that
state recognition of "civil unions" with all the practical benefits of
marriage, but without the symbolic approbation of the word itself,
is an adequate expression of the "equality" guarantee.8? One state
court, in Massachusetts, has disagreed with this conclusion, ruling
that separate but equal is as unjust in marital status as it was in
racially segregated public facilities. 88 In Connecticut and New
Hampshire, the state legislatures acted on their own, without any
compulsion from judges, to endorse civil unions but not "marriage"
84 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
85 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
86 See DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY
REVOLUTION 49 (2004).
87 See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196,224 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. Vermont,
744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
88 Opinions ofthe Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 & n.3 (Mass.
2004).
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as such for same-sex couples.89 Meanwhile, the federal courts are
keeping a cautious distance from these developments, and the
litigators on behalf of gays and lesbians are understandably and
properly keeping an exceedingly cautious distance from filing suit
in federal courts.90
All of this activity-the now-insistent public visibility of gays
and lesbians and the new judicial interventions-have brought us
toward the third step, as I have called it. The extension of empathy,
of an acknowledgment of shared humanity, by the old social
oppressors has not yet clearly or fully occurred. But the once-solid
front of oppression is crumbling, and none of us now can avoid
responsibility for our actions, either in continuing the old forms of
oppression or dismantling them. None of us can any longer say,
"It's not my doing. The world is just like this. You can't change
human nature." We have recently seen evidence of this process at
work in the turmoil introduced into the American Episcopal
Church by the election of an openly gay bishop and the recognition
of same-sex marital ceremonies by some of its members, which in
89 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38bb (West 2005); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 457-A: 1 (2007). Fully recognized marital status is available for same-sex
couples only in Massachusetts, as a result of the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass.
2003); same-sex civil unions with all state benefits except recognized marriage,
as such, are available in Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201-1207, tit. 18
§§ 5160-5169 (1999)) and New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-31 (West 2006
& Supp. 2007)) in response to judicial rulings, (Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864,
886 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006)), and in
Connecticut and New Hampshire where the legislatures acted on their own
initiative, without judicial mandate. By contrast, recognition of same-sex
marriage is constitutionally forbidden in twenty-seven states; in thirteen of
these, constitutional restrictions were adopted after the Massachusetts ruling in
Goodridge. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage,
Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited Oct. 14,2007).
90 See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 396 (2006) (approving federal court abstention to state courts
in constitutional challenge to gender-restrictive state marriage law).
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turn is forcing other members to take sides, to acknowled~e public
responsibility one way or another, in this moral reckoning. I
Judges interpreting the United States Constitution have an
important role to play in this moral reckoning. Sometimes they
have played this role with fidelity to their oaths of office;
sometimes they have defaulted. But whatever the judges do or do
not do, they should admit and we should all understand that our
constitutional guarantees are neither self-defining nor ultimately
defined by judges acting alone. This defining enterprise is a public
process of moral responsibility shared among all of us-eitizens,
elected officials, and judges. By this shared public process, "Our
constitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living
truth. ,,92
91 See Religious Tolerance.org, The Episcopal Church, USA and
Homosexuality, available at http://www.religioustolerance.orgihom_epis.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
92 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,20 (1958).
HeinOnline -- 17 Widener L.J. 96 2007-2008
